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ABSTRACT
This study is a pioneer in reporting about the impact of the 
Arab Spring at Gaza’s universities. It is grounded in 36 in- 
depth semi-structured interviews which I conducted with 
lecturers and students at two of the universities in Gaza, as 
part of a PhD thesis at the University of Cambridge (2012–17). 
Although the study has benefited from Freire’s and 
Bourdieu’s conceptual insights, it remains mainly data driven, 
giving primacy to the Southern experience of higher educa-
tion (HE) in Gaza. The article shows that although the socio- 
political changes in the Arab world had a negative impact on 
the Gaza HE experience, influenced by the spirit of the revo-
lutions, students felt encouraged to voice their discontent to 
their universities. Nonetheless, due to educational and poli-
tical barriers, Gaza students’ voices remain a cacophony; they 
are split between compliance and resistance.
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Introduction
The questions to be explored in this article are: how do educationalists at 
Gaza’s universities perceive the shifting socio-political context in the Arab 
World, and what current or future impact the Arab Spring may have on the 
educational context at their universities? This article takes the broad defini-
tion of impact offered by Oxford English Dictionary, as ‘a marked effect or 
influence’. The Gaza Strip is part of the ‘collective consciousness’ of the Arab 
world (Dabashi, 2012, p. 89), connecting synchronically with its ‘broad, 
powerful, transitional foci of identity’ (Khalidi, 1997, p. 171). The Arab 
world, particularly the close by Egypt, has also played a central role in 
Palestinian education and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
Starting from December 2010, the Arab world has witnessed unexpected 
revolutions and protests, toppling dictators in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and 
Yemen, and causing uprisings at other countries. Despite different expres-
sions, this historical phenomenon is internationally referred to as the ‘Arab 
Spring’. Such ‘grassroots and home-grown’ revolutions (Andersson & 
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Djeflat, 2012, p. 5), were mainly carried by the youth, who mobilized social 
media to create a sense of collective agency, calling for the reform of their 
governments (Gamson, 2011).
Evaluating the uprisings and their impact on regional and international 
levels ‘varies greatly according to where we come from and the issue on 
which we choose to focus’(Andersson & Djeflat, 2012, p. 1). Currently, the 
Arab world remains in a ‘transitional period [. . ., and there is not yet] a clear 
vision of where [the revolutions] might lead in concrete and definable terms’ 
(Pappé, 2014, p. 326). Even in countries such as Tunisia and Egypt, which 
witnessed a relative success of the Arab Spring, ‘they are still in the process 
of political transition with uncertain outcomes’ (Çarkoğlu et al., 2019, 
p. 447; also see Gabsi, 2019).
Despite this uncertainty, the literature indicates that ‘the Arab world has 
entered a new phase in its [. . .] history’ (Brynen et al., 2012, p. 301). The 
shifting socio-political context in the Arab world challenges ‘centuries of 
[Arab] stagnation’ that were maintained by Arab dictatorships regimes 
(Andersson & Djeflat, 2012, p. 19; Dabashi, 2012). These regimes’ attempts 
to domesticate cultural institutions and contain people’s awareness have 
failed (Brynen et al., 2012), as the youth has ‘inevitably come to see the 
world differently from the elderly’ (Andersson & Djeflat, 2012, p. 36). The 
21st century’s connectivity provided the youth with new engaging spaces 
that fostered a sense of collective agency among those of similar struggles in 
the Arab world and beyond (Farrell, 2012; Gamson, 2011). The media has 
also played an important role in making the Arab youth’s ‘political upheaval 
and revolution [. . .] circulated, promoted, and took on a multitude of forms’ 
(Kellner, 2013, p. 245).
An Arab Spring? The Palestinian experience
Danahar (2013) suggests that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict may not char-
acterize a new Middle East. But, the Arab revolutions proved to have 
a ‘nuclear reaction’, spreading from Egypt to other Arab countries (Dabashi, 
2012, p. 133). In the worldwide Arab Spring dialogue, there remains not 
a single study which explored the impact of the Arab Spring revolutions at 
Gaza’s universities. Pace (2013) argues that ‘Palestine has been a challenging 
case for academics attempting to explain the lack of political change in the 
Middle East’ (p. 44). Palestine is an area which has been under occupation for 
decades, where the uprising experience is common, and where the struggle 
against Israeli occupation represents ‘the ideological struggle of the Arab 
nationalists against Western imperialism’ (Shlaim, 2014, p. 383). Due to 
conditions of siege and violence, the Gaza Strip remains significantly under- 
researched (Roy, 1995; Shachar, 2010). Consequently, the Western ‘conceptual 
toolbox on authoritarian resilience and transition to democracy [is found] 
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lacking when applied to the [Occupied Palestinian Territories] OPT’ (Pace, 
2013, p. 56). That said, it is important ‘to read [the Arab uprisings] in the 
language that they exude and not in the vocabularies we have inherited’ 
(Dabashi, 2012, p. 63). The shifting socio-political context in the Arab world 
implies a renewed focus on the individual’s voice (Inbar, 2012) and ‘bottom 
up’ research (Gerges, 2014), to which this article is a meaningful contribution.
Methodology
The research design used the qualitative method approach, collecting data 
through 36 in-depth semi-structured interviews, which were conducted 
with male and female educationalists (15 academic staff; 21 students), via 
Skype from Cambridge. The participants were sampled from two of Gaza’s 
universities, using the snowballing method. Since I am a Palestinian, 
I addressed the risk of bias resulting from my insider-outsider positionality 
with respect to Gaza by using a self-interview protocol prior to conducting 
the study. I also used a power-relations sheet to aid contemplation of 
possible interactions and the best way to deal with them. I used an interview 
guide setting out the main themes. Scrivener software was also used to keep 
a digital journal to document insights or notes from the interview process. 
I developed a safe storage system. In this article, for example, all the names 
of the participants and their universities are pseudonyms. Academic parti-
cipants are referred to as ‘Mr/Ms [name] UA/UB’, and students as ‘[name] 
UA/UB’. For example, Ms Etaf UB is a female lecturer whose first name is 
Etaf and works at the UB university; Ahmed UA is a male student whose 
first name is Ahmed and studies at the UA university.
The data was analyzed using the social constructionist-interpretive para-
digm, which bridges the gap between the subjective and the objective, as well 
as allowing the researcher to explain the data creatively, as a shared meaning 
between the literature, the researcher and the participants. The interviews were 
recorded and transcribed by the researcher. I used MAXQDA software to 
generate codes from the transcribed data. Then, using the traditional sorting 
and piling method, I arranged the codes into categories of themes for argu-
ment. Each included perspectives from both participants’ views, which the 
researcher interpreted analytically in relation to each theme. Unless specified 
otherwise, words such as ‘the majority’, and ‘most’ in text reflect a position that 
applies to students and lecturers, as both separate groups and together.
Theoretical insights: Freire, Bourdieu, and the Southern experience of 
HE in Gaza
Retrospectively, this inductive research has benefited from insights available 
in the work of two theorists, namely those of Pierre Bourdieu on ‘symbolic 
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violence’, and in Paulo Freire’s Pedagogy of the Oppressed. Although Freire’s 
and Bourdieu’s conceptual tools for understanding power-relations overlap 
in their focus on domination, ‘Freire is much more optimistic than 
Bourdieu’ about the role of education in individual and societal transforma-
tion” (Burawoy, 2012, p. 111). Combining insights from both theorists, and 
casting them retrospectively and flexibly on the data, offers a space to benefit 
from their work, while leaving the ‘Southern’ experience of HE in Gaza to 
speak for itself, in its own language (Connell, 2007).
Oppression and symbolic violence
Freire (1996) defines oppression as ‘any situation in which “A” objectively 
exploits “B” or hinders his or her pursuit of self-affirmation as a responsible 
person’ (Freire, 1996, p. 37). Oppression in the Palestinian context operated 
on different levels and thus was not the same experience in all situations; it 
also varied in terms of its depth and power between the participants, for 
example, between males and females; lecturers and students; educationalists 
and the university administration. I chose the Freirean and Bourdieusian 
concepts that can apply to a range of meanings, as landmarks of an oppres-
sive experience:
In this article, I use Freire’s ‘de-humanization’ (Freire, 1996, p. 26) to 
point out the instances in which the humanity of the participants was 
distorted (e.g., through the siege, control on their freedoms). This may 
have taken place softly, through acts of ‘false generosity’ (Freire, 1996, 
p. 26). Concepts such as ‘fear’; ‘duality’; ‘self-depreciation’; ‘silence’; and 
‘fatalism’ show the impact of this de-humanization on the participants 
(Freire, 1996, pp. 29, 30, 45, 87,43). The concept of ‘horizontal violence’ 
(Freire, 1996, p. 44) is utilized primarily in relation to the Palestinian 
community in Gaza. I use ‘conquest’, ‘divide and rule’ and ‘manipulation’ 
to refer to ‘antidialogical’ actions that aimed to ‘impede communication 
[. . .] and destroy in the oppressed their quality as “considerers” of the world’ 
(Freire, 1996, pp. 129, 125, 128, 120).
Similarly, I use Bourdieu’s ‘symbolic violence’ to refer to the ‘distort-
ing effects [of power] upon individual autonomy and interests’ (Swartz, 
2013, p. 84), that are so often ‘naturalized’ based on a practical logic, 
that triggers ‘compliance’ as a response (Bourdieu, 1984, pp. 89, 471). 
This naturalization makes ‘objective limits become a sense of limits’ 
(ibid., p. 471), justifying one’s exclusion, and thus ‘reinforce[ing] and 
reproduce[ing] social hierarchies [. . . and] inegalitarian arrangements’ 
(Swartz, 2013, p. 84). The concept of ‘symbolic violence is corporal as 
well as cognitive and finds expression in all forms of body language’ 
(ibid., p. 92). This article focuses mainly on the cognitive aspect of 
‘symbolic violence’, indicated through reference to ‘naturalization’, 
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‘compliance’ (Bourdieu, 1984, pp. 89, 89, 471), and ‘dispositions’ 
(Swartz, 2013, p. 89); symbolic violence ‘works only on the basis of 
[one’s] depositions [which makes one] thereby primed for it’ (Bourdieu, 
2001, p. 38).
These concepts of Freire’s and Bourdieu’s spoke to my data, and allowed 
a close and critical understanding of Gaza educationalists’ voices. 
Conversely, the data offered a snapshot of educationalists’ experiences in 
which the concepts of these theorists could be in dialogue with each other 
and with the original data from the Gaza Strip, showing how they may apply 
to a challenging conflict environment.
Findings
The following is my interpretation of educationalists’ perspectives towards 
the Arab Spring and what current and future impact it may have on the 
educational context at Gaza’s universities. I constructed this interpretation 
based on my inductive analysis of the data, and with reference to the existing 
literature and the theoretical insights.
Perspectives on the Arab revolutions
The interviews with students and their lecturers on their perspectives 
towards the Arab Spring revealed a degree of ambivalence, and pessimism. 
Regarding whether the revolutions should have happened or not, the 
majority of the participants acknowledged that the revolutions were moti-
vated by ‘the demand for economic opportunity, social justice, human 
rights, political reform, and above all national dignity’ (Campante & Chor, 
2012). Nonetheless, at least two participants, Dalal UA and Ms Etaf UB 
‘feared’ that the Arab Spring was caused by a conspiracy; a ‘manipulation’ by 
the West against Islam as a religion, or by the USA in support of Israel in 
relation to its Arab neighbours (Freire, 1996, pp. 29, 128). Amira UB also 
argued: ‘because of what we are seeing nowadays, they shouldn’t have 
happened.’ A degree of ambivalence is expected since as Dupont and 
Passy (2011) explain, ‘the final outcome of the [revolutionary episodes] is 
very much uncertain’ (p. 450).
When contemplating the consequences of the revolutions, the over-
whelming majority of the participants were inclined to ‘self-depreciation’ 
(Freire, 1996, p. 45). Ms Amna UA thought that ‘there will be chaos’; Ms 
Omar UB explained: ‘it is an autumn’; and Tamara UB stated: ‘the future is 
dark’. In fact, several writings, with similar pessimism, considered ‘the 
phrase “Arab Spring” [. . .] a misnomer’ (Totten et al., 2012, p. 23). They 
took ‘turmoil, violence, and corruption [. . .] as evidence [. . .] of the 
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES IN SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION 5
immaturity or irrationality of [the Arab and Muslim] population, rather 
than as a sign of the previous dictatorship’s pathologies’ (Berman, 
2013, p. 65).
Similarly, in the interviews, Gaza educationalists have focused on the 
weaknesses, the obstacles and the complexities involved in the liberation 
process. Talal UA argued: ‘even if the governments have changed, this might 
not have an impact’; and Mr Omar UB complained that ‘democratic atmo-
sphere does not work for Arabs’. Participants lacked trust in their own Arab 
governments as well as ‘self-depreciated’ themselves as Arab people (Freire, 
1996, p. 45). This concurs with Freire’s argument that ‘domination is itself 
objectively divisive [. . . and results in] the individual [. . . being] divided 
between an identical past and present, and a future without hope’ (ibid., 
p. 154).
To sum up, despite a degree of ambivalence towards whether the revolu-
tions should have happened or not, most participants ‘feared’ how the Arab 
Spring events might unfold in the future (Freire, 1996, p. 29). There was also 
a pessimism that is related to Arab and Muslim people more generally. In 
his Orientalism, Edward Said has warned that ‘to be Orientalized [. . .] 
implies Orientals themselves internalizing the dominant Orientalist dis-
courses’ about their own inferiority in relation to the Occident – the 
imperialist West (Traboulsi, 2009, p. 180). Barakat (1993), also argues that 
not only has ‘Western scholarship [constantly portrayed] Arab society as 
constant and static [. . . but also] Arab intellectuals have themselves deplored 
the lack of change and lamented the futility of struggle’ (p. 22). The majority 
of the research participants were ‘conservative [. . . as if they were] lament-
[ing] the turbulence of the new era and look[ing] back wistfully to the 
supposed stability and security of its authoritarian predecessors’ (Berman, 
2013, p. 64).
The possible current and future impact of the Arab revolutions on Gaza
In this section, I firstly map the impact of the Arab Spring on the Gaza 
Strip, then explain how the educational context at Gaza’s universities has 
been affected by the socio-political changes in the Arab world. Only a few 
participants negated any influence of the Arab revolutions on the Gaza 
Strip, such as Huda UA who argued that ‘life is still difficult for people’. 
Most of the interviewees, lecturers and students, asserted that the turbu-
lent conditions in the Arab world, particularly in Egypt, had affected their 
daily life. Ms Amna UA said: ‘of course, the impact is clear, which is more 
degradation for Gaza’; and Nora UA argued: ‘whatever happens in Egypt 
affects us’.
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The impact on the Gaza Strip
The data from the interviews show that the changes in the Arab world had 
impacted some of the economic, social and psychological aspects of 
Palestinian life in Gaza. From an economic perspective, Abdullah UA 
explained how the economic conditions in Gaza had significantly shifted 
across the three Egyptian successive governments since 2011:
In the days of Mubarak, we were living a decent life and the days of Morsi, we were 
living the best life, but now we are living the most miserable life . . .
Abdullah’s observation is consistent with Dickstein’s (2014) view that ‘once 
a relatively reliable arbiter of Gaza–Israel conflicts, and then a supporter of 
Hamas, Egypt is now defining a new role for itself’ (p. 11). According to 
Hassan (2015), ‘the Palestinians factions’ alignment with the brotherhood, 
Sisi’s sworn enemy, has brought Egypt’s threat assessments [of Gaza] even 
closer to those of Israel’ (p. 170). Al Sisi’s ‘Egyptian government closed the 
Rafah border crossing, stopping the flow of goods and individuals that 
travelled between Egypt and Gaza’ (Dickstein, 2014, p. 10). Consequently, 
educationalists including Khaled UB, have perceived the Arab revolutions 
causing more ‘de-humanization’ (Freire, 1996, p. 26) for the Gaza Strip as he 
mentioned: ‘they closed the border; nothing enters to us [. . . .]. The prices 
increase and decrease based on the border’. Instability and border restric-
tions created irregularity, ‘fear’ and a sense of ‘fatalism’ with regard to the 
market (Freire, 1996, pp. 29, 43). At least four participants (one member of 
academic staff, and three students) described Gaza as a prison. Dalal UA, 
moreover, stated, ‘we live as animals- they just open the border and rush 
through the food for us, and then they close it’. This is in line with Li’s 
(2008) argument:
Israel now treats the Strip [not as a prison, but] more like a zoo” [. . . where . . .] the 
concern is how to keep those held inside alive, with an eye to how outsiders might see 
them [while] the question of freedom is never raised. (p. 1)
From a social perspective, Halima was married to an Egyptian whose family 
lived in Sinai. Dyer and Kessler (2014) explain that after ‘the 2011 revolution 
[in Egypt], the Sinai [peninsula] has experienced a downward spiral in 
security’ (p. 5). Consequently, ‘a series of military operations in the Sinai’s 
northern governorate’ were launched by the Egyptian authorities on armed 
groups (ibid., p. 6). This affected Halima as well as her husband’s family who 
came to visit her but could not get back and stayed at her house for a month 
when she was a newly-wedded bride. In the interview, Halima also indicated 
that the relationship between her and her Egyptian husband continued to be 
good only because he chose to support Palestinians. Also, some of Tamara 
UB’s Egyptian friends have ‘started making these Facebook pages to insult 
Palestinians’. This resulting ‘horizontal violence’ between Egyptians and 
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Palestinians have intensified Palestinians’ feeling of isolation in Gaza 
(Freire, 1996, p. 44).
On the psychological level, the Arab revolutions resulted in a dissonant 
symphony of emotions among Gaza educationalists. Almost all the partici-
pants ‘self-depreciated’ themselves as Arabs (Freire, 1996, p. 45), while 
stressing their belonging to Palestinianism as if a different national group. 
In a way, this implies that the old colonialist strategy of ‘divide and rule’ in 
the Middle East has worked in the long run (ibid., p. 125). Also, the majority 
of the participants were convinced that Arab world youth was actually 
inspired by the Palestinian example. For example, Mr Suleiman UA empha-
sized: ‘we initiated [the Arab Spring] when we had the hasm- [meaning 
Hamas-Fatah conflict]’. Mr Ashraf UB also mentioned Palestinian initiation 
of the first and the second Intifadas (uprisings) long before the Arab 
revolutions (Mr Ashraf UB). (see Pace, 2013). Also, while Mr Riyad UA 
have shown empathy with his Syrian neighbours as he viewed the Syrian war 
to be more dramatic than the 2014 Israeli operation on Gaza, Moeen UA 
conversely argued that the revolutions had in fact pushed other Arabs to 
empathize with Palestinians when they have experienced similar ‘de- 
humanization’ and violence (Freire, 1996, p. 26). Another psychological 
impact was expressed by Mr Omar UB who worried that the ‘political 
affiliations that happened in Syria [. . . would] appear in Gaza’, bringing 
them more misery to be added to that resulting from the Israeli occupation. 
As Akbarzadeh (2015) explains, ‘the Arab upheaval has morphed into 
sectarian warfare, championed by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria 
[ISIS]’ (p. 44). According to Alijla (2015), the current difficult conditions 
resulted in an increased number of Palestinians joining ‘ISIS’ and ‘the 
Salafi[st] groups [. . . which are] funded by Saudi Arabia’ in Gaza (p. 66). 
Zelin (2014) points out, for example, that ‘jihadists in Gaza/Sinai [. . .] have 
posted pro-ISIS propaganda’ (p. 6). As Omar ‘feared’ the ramifications of 
this for Gaza (Freire, 1996, p. 29), he commented, ‘we do not want them; we 
are normal people [. . .]. Our conditions are different from everyone’.
So, to conclude, the Arab Spring has, on various levels, affected the local 
context in the Gaza Strip.
The impact on the educational context of Gaza’s universities
With the Arab revolutions, the siege was intensified on the Gaza Strip, 
restricting universities’ exchange, quality and funding (Freire, 1996, p. 26). 
Below are examples on these three issues:
Describing the siege, Alaa UB said, ‘it is death, death. In fact, death is 
more merciful’. An intensified siege after Al Sisi’s government in Egypt, 
affected participants’ mobility and academic networking, including the 
attendance of conferences. Ms Jamila UA cancelled three conferences 
last year because she was not able to cross; and Nora UA described the 
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situation at her university as ‘paralyzed’. The siege also affected students’ 
access to study materials. Also, there has been a ‘chronic electricity deficit 
[in Gaza for 9 years which has] disrupted the delivery of basic services and 
undermined already vulnerable livelihoods and living conditions’(OCHA 
OPT, 2015, p. 2). The United Nations (2012) states that ‘the cuts affect 
private businesses and homes, health services, wastewater treatment 
plants, and schools. Many of these rely on back-up generators’ (p. 10). 
According to OCHA OPT (2015), the ‘situation has further deteriorated 
since June 2013’ (p. 2). An intensified siege on Gaza limited the exporta-
tion of other sources of fuel from Egypt to fill these generators.
The quality of HE in Gaza has also deteriorated after the Arab Spring 
revolutions. Mr Ashraf UB indicated that parents have become more ‘fear-
ful’ of sending their daughters to study abroad even in Arab countries. 
Johansson-Nogués (2013) points out that ‘democratic revolutions [. . .] 
constitute a moment of high risk for [. . . women] as they may become 
subjects of new or renewed and/or (re) structured [gendered] violence 
from the state and/or their fellow citizens’ (p. 409).
On the contrary, Mr Ashraf UB and Ms Jamila UA have both argued of an 
‘inward mobility’ in Gaza’s universities, for example, from Syria. According 
to Fargues and Fandrich (2012), migration ‘from Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, 
Egypt, Lebanon and Syria have been increasing’ since the Arab Spring (p. 3). 
Jammal (2015) reports that a group of ‘Syrians made the dangerous trip 
across the Sinai and into the Gaza through smuggling tunnels [. . . where 
they] have quickly got established in Gaza, setting up businesses and starting 
families’ (no pagination). Mr Zeyad UB pointed to increased enrolment at 
Gaza’s universities, especially on the master’s programme: ‘there is siege, 
people are bored, and the economic situation is weak [. . .]. All this resulted 
in more opening and licensing of private universities’. Between the years 
1993 and 2011, ‘the enrolment rate of students in higher education increased 
by 940 [per cent, with an observed narrowing in] the gender gap’ (“UNDP,” 
2014, p. 4). Also according to United Nations (2012), ‘the number of school- 
age children is projected to increase [. . . in 2020] by an average of 14,000 -
per year’ (United Nations, 2012, p. 15), posing further challenges for HE in 
Gaza.
An intensified siege on Gaza created a financial crisis at these HE institu-
tions. Mr Mehdi UA stated: ‘now [. . .] we do not take a full salary; we only 
take 70% of it’. Student tuition fees constituted the most reliable source of 
funding for Gaza’s universities. Under a ‘de-humanizing’ economic block-
ade, however, students were not able to pay (Freire, 1996, p. 26). Universities 
have also become less able to afford giving scholarships for students. Samah 
UA complained that her lecturers were ‘unfair’ because they tried to ‘lessen 
[students’] marks in order not to give [distinction] scholarships’.
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To summarize, the Arab Spring affected the context for Gaza’s univer-
sities, leaving them frozen into a position of no choice but to operate locally 
and prioritize immediate needs over quality and prospects.
New campus dynamics? Student discontent and barriers to voice
In this section, I discuss students’ discontents and the barriers to their voice 
at Gaza’s universities: Despite students growing dissatisfactions with their 
HE experiences after the Arab revolutions, the interview data shows that 
they were at the same time, for and against change. Voice is perceived here 
as a ‘slippery term’ (McLeod, 2011, p. 181). It ‘is not simply speech [. . . voice 
means] identity or agency, or even power, and perhaps capacity or aspira-
tion; it [. . . represents] difference, [. . . and sometimes] connote[s] 
a democratic politics of participation and inclusion [. . . it is students’] 
right (to be heard, to have a say)’ (ibid.).
A few protests occurred at Gaza’s campuses which the interviewees, 
students and their lecturers, have classified as influenced by the spirit 
of the revolutions in the Arab world. The focus of these protests 
ranged from minor to larger issues. Samah UA commented on one 
protest in which students were objecting to an increase in UA’s tuition 
as follows: ‘it was the first time for the students to complain and [. . .] 
to do something against the university [. . . .]. The university 
responded to them and accepted what they wanted’. Similarly, Nora 
UA described this instance of the protest as ‘something new, [. . .] and 
a sort of a victory’ for students. Halima UA, as another example, said: 
‘I think some lecturers treat me badly, I think I should make 
a revolution against them’. Halima was not joking, but she ended up 
cancelling this idea so that she can safely graduate from the university. 
Yasser UB also reported: ‘we were planning a carefully orchestrated 
campaign [. . .], but other students were [. . .] scared to death’. Since 
this protest was related to a freedom of speech issue, and not to 
tuition fees, although it happened after 2011, the university did not 
respond to it.
Using Arab Spring Slogans: The data shows that so often in the protests, 
students used the same slogans that the youth in Egypt’s Tahrir Square 
used requesting the downfall of Mubarak, especially ‘the people want the 
fall of the regime’. Gaza university students would start their protests by 
chanting ‘the people want . . . ’, and then add their requests such as 
‘justice’, ‘revision of the exams’, or a ‘new lecturer’. Yasser UB, for 
example, witnessed it in a campaign under ‘the people want mid-term 
exams’. They wanted mid-term exams, so as not to set for a final exam of 
the total grade.
In fact, ‘there is more at stake in these couplet-slogans than [. . .] a purely 
semantic meaning’ (Sowers & Toensing, 2012, p. 50). In the Egyptian 
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revolution, ‘the act of singing and shouting with large groups of fellow 
citizens has created a certain and palpable sense of community that had 
not existed before’ (ibid.). Using slogans collectively also ‘satirizes feared 
public figures’ (ibid.). Ms Etaf UB said that ‘a group from the University 
students went calling upon the university’s president [. . .] by saying “Irhal 
[An Arab Spring slogan meaning: Leave]”, as they wanted the tuition fees to 
be reduced’. Surprisingly, none of the students or academic staff participants 
at the UA mentioned the use of such slogans at their university.
Political Protests in Campus: Almost all the UA and UB participants had 
either witnessed or participated in campus protests after 2011, some of 
which were political. According to Halima UA, ‘students [went] calling 
Fatah and Hamas to unite and end the Palestinian separation’. Khaled UB 
also mentioned that the UB student union organized a sit-in inside the 
university in which both students and the academic staff had joined, chant-
ing and holding posters. These sit-ins were advertised on Facebook which 
indicates that the ‘young [. . . Palestinian] generation [. . . works] to benefit 
from a new wave of unifying innovation’ to advance political activism 
(Bracher, 2013, p. 56).
Student political protests regarding Fatah- Hamas unity have not always 
continued peacefully when they were taken from campus to the streets of 
Gaza. Tamara UB reported:
Students went out in [peaceful] protests maseerat to stop the Palestinian division [. . .]. 
But, the [Hamas] policemen [. . .] came and spread the people all around and took the 
guys who organized these to jail.
According to Sherwood (2011), ‘the revolutionary unrest sweeping across 
the Arab world has spurred [students in Gaza in the 15th March Movement] 
to try to translate their “Manifesto for Change” into street protests. But they 
face[d] formidable obstacles’ (no pagination). As Saleh (2011) explains, both 
Hamas’s and Fatah’s reactions to the 15th March Movement was as follows:
They ‘tried to swim with the tide [. . . to] appear as a champion of unity and national 
reconciliation. In reality, [however, they] used [their] security forces to undermine the 
movement’s fundamental objectives’ (Saleh, 2011; see also Human Rights Watch, 
2011).
Hence, Palestinian factions’ endorsement of this movement was a ‘false 
generosity’, a form of ‘manipulation’, and ‘horizontal violence’ towards 
their fellow Palestinians, which aimed to instil ‘fear’ in the young people 
and ‘silence’ the voices of change (Freire, 1996, pp. 26, 128, 44, 29, 87).
Misapplication: Although students have learnt useful lessons from the 
Arab Spring, not all of them seemed to implement them favourably. 
Students have sometimes attempted resistance in relation to minor issues 
in the educational context. Samira UA regretted that a few female students 
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who had a reservation on inviting a journalist to the university, because, he 
was a supportive of Israel in his youth, hold posters in his seminar, saying 
‘you are not welcome in Gaza’. Ms Etaf UB also complained that students 
wanted to assert themselves in her class regarding academic assignments: ‘if 
you tell the students that, for example, they will have a quiz, students will 
burst shouting loudly and in one voice that they do not want to’.
Resisting Artfully and Silently: Unable to change simple things at their 
universities, most of the students have resorted to passive-aggressive beha-
viour, as will be discussed soon. On the productive side, Abdullah UA and 
other students used the art of performing drama as an alternative way to 
voicing their dissatisfactions with the Palestinian Schism without direct 
confrontation with authorities inside and outside the university. This con-
solidates Bracher’s (2013) argument that after the revolutions ‘Arab people 
appear to be [. . .] re-imagining their warrior identity in new guises that 
promotes peaceful discourse and reconciliation’ (p. 36). On the negative 
side, gossip and murmurs were also how students could express their 
discontents. Lecturers such as Ms Jamila UA were aware of existing stu-
dents’ dissatisfaction as she commented: ‘in fact, behind the lecturers’ back, 
there is bad naming, and other things’. Huda UA also explained that to resist 
‘silently’ is natural for the student body (Freire, 1996, p. 87). Hence, gossip 
and murmuring were perceived as a way of catharsis; an alternative to 
action. Nonetheless, Candela (2005), explains that ‘murmuring [. . . should 
not be taken as] a misbehaviour, but rather a counterscript consisting of 
a different version of what was seen. [. . . ;] an “exercise of power” ’ (p. 198).
To sum up, the Arab revolutions have triggered more awareness of 
student grievances. Despite students feeling a sense of agency, they often 
ended up sabotaging and ‘silencing’ their own voices (Freire, 1996, p. 87). 
This is consistent with the view of Barakat (1993) who states:
Arabs [. . .] have become powerless, [. . .] alienated from, and within [. . . their] 
institutions of learning [. . . and] excluded from participation in the making of their 
own futures . . . (pp.26-27)
Barriers to voice
Ideally, ‘all young people [. . . should be able] to influence the processes and 
outcomes of their own education’ (Cremin et al., 2011, p. 586). Due to 
barriers within their universities, students in Gaza ‘self-depreciated’ their 
voices. Two of the strongest barriers to student voice were their perception 
of HE as not being a priority under occupation; and universities’ control.
Under the ‘dehumanizing’ conditions of the Gaza Strip, reforming HE 
was not seen as a priority. Students’ nationalistic ‘dispositions’ (Swartz, 
2013, p. 89) made them ‘fear’ that revolutionary action for reform would 
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be counterproductive to Palestinian welfare under occupation (Freire, 1996, 
p. 29). Nawal UA stated: ‘students are supposed to fight over the things 
which they should fight for; Palestine, Jerusalem, Al Aqsa mosque – not over 
trivial matters’. Also, Ferial UA, ‘naturalizing’ educational problems, 
explained they ‘can be found in any other university of the world and so 
they are not a big deal’.
The second barrier to voice, which is university control, is better 
explained through an analogy of Palestinian universities as ‘mini-states 
inside the occupied territor[ies]’ (Jebril, 2006, p. 76), and the administra-
tions as ruling regimes of campus. In the aftermath of the Arab revolutions, 
there has been a degree of ‘fear’ from, and ‘silencing’ of, students’ voice by 
their universities (Freire, 1996, pp. 29, 87). Mr Omar UB gives an interesting 
description of the administration’s reaction to students’ protest:
The university here does something strange. Administration people would be stand-
ing near the windows counting the number of rebellious students [in the campus . . .]. 
As they reached only 200, the person said, ‘Forget about them. Let them go away to 
hell. They have no value’.
Counting the number of students as a measure of their power reminds us of 
the scene of the 2011 Egyptian revolution. Thus it was ‘the occupation of 
Tahrir Square, day and night, by mass numbers of peaceful protestors [. . .] 
of an important urban space in the major city that brought down 
a repressive and tenacious government’ (Elshahed, 2011, no pagination). 
Mr Zeyad UB explained this administration’s caution from student mass 
protests by pointing out that ‘if something happens within the university, 
[. . .] it will spread over to the level of the society’. Because the UA and the 
UB have alleged political roots, which connects them to competing 
Palestinian factions, this point is critical. Sampson’s (1967) explains that 
‘the university [. . . could act] as a major vehicle of organized dissent’ (p. 1). 
Hence, the inter-relatedness between the educational and the political con-
text in Gaza makes it important for Gaza universities to ‘conquer’ its student 
body (Freire, 1996, p. 129). This is consistent with Freire who argues that the 
‘existential duality [of the oppressed] may facilitate the rise of a sectarian 
climate leading to the installation of bureaucracies’ (ibid., p. 108).
In fact, ‘a sense of agency about one’s life is [also] both nurtured and 
discouraged in and through the educational process’ (Mcintyre, 2006, 
p. 629). That said, such control over students’ voice was also a result of an 
inherited traditional system of education at Gaza’s universities. Halima UA 
pointed out that her university’s administration ‘don’t change themselves 
[. . . because] the idea [of doing that] is non-existent at [her] university’. 
Halima’s criticism resonates with Boyce’s (2003) argument that ‘the chal-
lenge of successful change is less planning and implementing and more 
developing and sustaining new ways of seeing, deciding, and acting’ (133). 
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Talal UA also perceived it as a ‘fate’ for students that they ‘won’t be able to 
change the system of [their] university’. Ibtisam added that students who 
protest against the university risk their marks being reduced by their 
department as a punishment. But, Educational institutions should be ‘dig-
nifying students not degrading them’ (Sukarieh, 2019, p. 186). Using 
a ‘carrot-and-stick’ approach to control student voice is an ‘antidialgoical’ 
practice (Freire, 1996, p. 161). Brynen et al. (2012) similarly notes that prior 
to the Arab revolutions, ‘a plethora of [. . .] awards were created [by the 
bureaucratic regimes] to domesticate large swathes of the intellectual class’ 
(p. 289), in order to ‘divide’ and ‘silence’ the voices of change (Freire, 1996, 
pp. 125, 87).
Ms Randa UA argued that her university offers several channels for 
students to shape their HE experience. Almost all students from the same 
university perceived the UA’s channels of communication to be a ‘false 
generosity’ (Freire, 1996, p. 26). Talal UA indicated that except in the case of 
tuition fees where the university would work to ‘solve [the problem] par-
tially or wholly’, the administration’s response would be ‘we cannot change 
the university’s system’. As McLeod (2011) explains, ‘the challenge for [. . .] 
higher education [. . . is not] in inciting student voice, but in converting that 
opportunity into meaningful and practical recognition’ (p. 188).
Freire argues that ‘culture as superstructure [. . .] can maintain “rem-
nants” of the past’ (Freire, 1996, p. 140). Consequently, the oppressed ‘as 
dual beings [. . .] accept [. . .] power which becomes bureaucratized [within 
their own society] and which violently represses them’ (Freire, 1996, p. 140). 
For example, students ‘self-depreciated’ their agency and preferred to 
remain ‘silent’ about their discontents and accept them as a ‘fate’ (ibid., 
pp. 45, 87, 43). What contributed to this was that students’ few attempts at 
protest were frustrated. Tamara UB viewed protesting as ‘a big mistake’, and 
Khaled UB explained that they felt as if they ‘were just going around 
[themselves]’. Their failed experiences acted as a deterrent from further 
attempts to make their voices heard.
To sum up, due to barriers to student voice such as universities’ control, 
and HE not being a priority, students currently remain, as Freire suggests, 
‘Subjects in expectancy’ (Freire, 1996, p. 112).
Conclusion: a ‘Cacophony of voices’
The ‘Arab Spring has clearly brought a change in the way that young people 
engage in societal issues, and also in the way governments and public 
authorities [including HE institutions] view themselves and their constitu-
ents’ (Andersson & Djeflat, 2012, p. 1). The Arab Spring had an impact on 
Gaza’s universities. Firstly, after the Arab Spring, educationalists experi-
enced a variety of emotions, although they were inclined mainly to 
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pessimism and ‘self-depreciation’. Secondly, the turbulence in Egypt 
reflected negatively on living conditions in Gaza and tightened the siege 
further on educationalists and their HE institutions affecting exchange, 
quality and funding. This also resulted in students having antagonistic 
attitudes towards other Arabs, including Egyptians. Thirdly, on a few occa-
sions, the students attempted to capitalize on the spirit of the revolution to 
call attention to their discontent. They held protests and used some of the 
slogans that were used by the youth in the Egyptian Tahrir Square. 
Nonetheless, students misapplied the lessons from the Arab Spring to 
minor issues at their universities instead of calling for basic rights and 
freedoms; fearing the consequences, they often ended up sabotaging their 
own voices.
Overall, although the revolutions in the Arab world seem to have trig-
gered more awareness of students’ grievances and discontent, these are 
challenged by the traditional universities’ contexts. Because of educational 
and political barriers, students voices are a cacophony; they remain split 
between ‘compliance’ and resistance (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 471). Students were 
cautious about testing their voices rather than acting upon them. Talal UA 
summarized this strategy as follows: ‘this is the status quo, so do not oppose 
[. . .]. Wait until a change happens, and then change your direction’. Thus, 
‘compliance’ is perceived here as a practical strategy (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 471) 
of resistance. This is consistent with the view of Bourdieu (1990) who argues 
that ‘resistance may be alienating and submission may be liberating’ (p. 
155). Freire also argues that ‘those who perceive the infeasibility or inap-
propriateness of one or another form of action (which should accordingly be 
postponed or substituted) cannot thereby be accused of inaction. Critical 
reflection is also action’ (Freire, 1996, p. 109). Khaled UB stated that for 
change to happen in Gaza, people need to be self-critical, because ‘Allah 
does not change a people´s lot unless they change what is in their hearts’ (a 
translation from Quran: Surah Ar-Ra’ed: The Thunder (13:11)).
So, what does all this mean in the future for the HE experience in Gaza? 
Sampson (1967) explains that when students commit themselves to change 
‘they [can be] the triggers that release [. . .] a barely tapped reservoir of 
national energy’ (p. 1). A cacophony of voices at Gaza universities showed 
that students have not reached anywhere near ‘boiling point’, nor are they 
likely to reach it in the near future. Sensibly, students were weighing their 
discontents with the barriers they face in calling for change. The Arab 
revolutions made them feel even more confused about ‘compliance’, and 
resistance. In fact, the contemporary Arab world, more generally, was 
defined by Barakat (1993) ‘as an association of contradictions’, and com-
plexities (p. 22). Despite differences, students in the Gaza Strip are part of 
this cultural context.
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How the HE experience will evolve in the future is uncertain. Three 
themes seem powerful and are likely to influence the experience of HE in 
Gaza in the coming years: (1) Gaza’s universities will continue to struggle in 
a context of occupation and tradition to achieve a quality experience that is 
democratic; (2) funding is the main regulator of stability or instability at 
Gaza’s universities that can be used for and/or against students; and (3) the 
culture of these HE institutions will, albeit very slowly, open up as a result of 
increased female participation in HE since 2011 (see: “UNDP,” 2014, p. 4). 
The interaction of these themes is unpredictable; therefore, these develop-
ments are best looked at as a tray of colour beads in which the beads can be 
fused in different ways to create mosaic and envision contrasting realities of 
Gaza’s universities in the future.
In the meantime, Gaza universities students remain in a neutral condition 
that is similar to that of a ‘Brown Dwarf’, a substellar or an astronomical 
object that might be classified as either a sub-star or a super planet for it 
holds some of the characteristics of both. So far, students’ conflicting voices 
make it a challenge to discern whether students’ dissatisfaction will lead to 
reform in the future or their barriers will silence them before they achieve 
any ‘meaningful transformation’ (see Freire, 2003, p. 161). Hence, ‘in work-
ing towards liberation, one must neither lose sight of [the oppressed] 
passivity nor overlook the moment of awakening’ (ibid., p. 46).
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